The paper analyses the stabilising potential of simple fiscal policy rules for a small open economy in monetary union in a 2-region DSGE model with nominal and real rigidities. We consider simple fiscal instrument rules for government purchases, transfers, and consumption, labour and capital taxes in analogy to interest rate rules in monetary policy. The paper finds a dichotomy in the welfare effects of fiscal policy for liquidity-constrained and intertemporal optimising households, i.e. policies enhancing the welfare of one group tend to reduce the welfare of the other one. Moderate average welfare gains from optimal policy contrast with large losses from non-optimal policy. Fiscal rules that respond to employment fluctuations may be preferred to rules responding to indicators of price competitiveness, because optimal policy in the former corresponds more closely to the idea of countercyclical stabilisation. The paper also emphasises the strong impact of the budgetary closure rule on the welfare effects of business cycle stabilisation.
Introduction
This paper investigates the potential of simple fiscal policy rules to stabilise cyclical fluctuations and reduce the welfare cost of supply and demand shocks in monetary union. The focus is on the stabilisation of asymmetric shocks at the level of small member states, which are not stabilised by the reaction of the common monetary policy to area-wide variables, so that fiscal policy remains the (only) macroeconomic policy tool available.
The paper, hence, reconsiders a classical question of the currency union literature, namely the importance and potential of fiscal policy to stabilise asymmetric shocks at the level of the member countries. We address the question in a setting that differentiates between alternative fiscal instruments (government purchases, transfers, and consumption, labour and capital taxes) and applies the idea of simple instrument rules to the conduct of fiscal policy.
We focus the discussion on the potential of simple fiscal instrument rules to stabilise and reduce the welfare costs of temporary demand and supply shocks, i.e. business cycle fluctuations around a sustainable long-term growth path. The paper analyses temporary changes in fiscal variables in reaction to temporary macroeconomic fluctuations. It does not address the potential of fiscal reforms to correct persistent imbalances in monetary union through internal devaluation (e.g., de Mooij and Keen 2012, Farhi et al. 2011) , even though cyclical stabilisation in the short term may help preventing the build-up of persistent imbalances in a setting with strong inertia in economic forces.
The paper does also not analyse situations in which union-wide monetary policy is constraint at the zero bound or by frictions in the monetary transmission channel, so that country-level fiscal policies might (have to) substitute for monetary policy at the level of the monetary union aggregate. An adequate framework for this type of question would have to develop on the (conditions for) cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal policy interaction.
Although macroeconomic policy faces new and urgent challenges in the context of the financial crisis and euro area imbalances, the classical question of business cycle stabilisation in a monetary union with asymmetric shocks remains a relevant one. The empirical literature for Europe and the United States demonstrates that the degree of shock smoothing by market forces is limited in advanced economies. Afonso and Furceri (2008) show for the euro area that shock smoothing by private savings and intertemporal income transfers is moderate and 3 that smoothing through cross-border factor income flows is low, which implies that international risk sharing is weak. Similarly, Asdrubali et al. (1996) and Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2001) document limited shock smoothing through household savings and capital markets across U.S. states. At the same time, these studies and Arreaza et al. (1998) illustrate the shock-smoothing potential of fiscal policy inside EMU and in the U.S.
The paper develops a two-region New Keynesian DSGE model with goods, labour and financial market frictions. The analysis of fiscal stabilisation policy focuses on a small member country in monetary union, which excludes feedback to monetary policy and the rest of monetary union (RoU) in the model. Besides this simplifying implication, the focus on a small member economy is motivated by the fact that the potential of fiscal policy to stabilise business cycle fluctuations is particularly relevant for small member countries of monetary union as the latter have no/little impact on union-wide aggregates and tend to be more exposed to idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks because of higher openness and stronger specialisation. The small-country setting differs from previous research that has focused on fiscal policy in monetary unions of two large/symmetric countries and the interactions between centralised monetary and decentralised fiscal policy with a smaller set of policy instruments (e.g., Beetsma and Jensen, 2004; Ferrero, 2009; Kirsanova et al., 2007) .
This papers' analytical framework is inspired by Galí and Monacelli (2008) who discuss optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a monetary union of small economies with government purchases as fiscal instrument, price stickiness as friction, and technology shocks as exogenous disturbance. We broaden the analysis in a number of important dimensions by: (1) considering simple fiscal instrument rules for a range of policy parameters instead of focusing exclusively on optimal policy, which provides information about the robustness of simple instrument rules, the potential welfare gain from optimal stabilisation and the welfare costs of non-optimal policy, (2) having a larger variety of policy instruments (government purchases, transfers, and consumption, labour and capital taxes), (3) introducing physical capital, which appears important in the context of distortionary taxation, (4) including additional frictions (wage stickiness, financial frictions, capital adjustment costs, and a time-to-build constraint for capital) and (5) adding demand shocks to the model. The model does include neither government employment nor public investment. Government purchases are modelled as consumption of private-sector output. All employment is private-sector employment.
In light of the empirical evidence (e.g., Kollmann, 1996) we depart from the assumption of perfect cross-border risk sharing in Beetsma and Jensen (2004) , Ferrero (2009) , Galí and Monacelli (2008) and Kirsanova et al. (2007) and introduce a debt-dependent country risk premium (e.g., Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2003) as closure for the external account. On the domestic side, we introduce liquidity-constrained (LC) along non-constrained (NLC) households. LC households have no access to financial markets and always consume their currently disposable labour and transfer income. NLC households have access to financial markets to save/borrow in order to smooth income and consumption over time.
The presence of LC households can account for the positive correlation between private and government consumption at business cycle frequencies (e.g., Galí et al., 2007) , and estimated macro models of the euro area (e.g., Forni et al., 2009; Ratto et al., 2009 ) indicate the share of LC households to be high. The presence of LC households broadens the case for stabilisation policy beyond price/wage stickiness. As the government has an advantage over LC households in terms of its access to capital market, it can smooth the income and utility of LC households and mitigate the welfare cost of the LC households' borrowing/lending constraint.
The paper finds a dichotomy in the welfare effects of fiscal policy responses to cyclical fluctuations for LC and NLC households. Policies that are welfare enhancing from the perspective of LC households tend to be costly from the perspective of NLC households. The potential overall welfare gain under the on-average optimal simple rule is typically moderate when compared to the potential welfare costs of non-optimal policy. The potential welfare gains for LC households are much larger, however, as those typically found in models of stabilisation policy that only include intertemporally optimising agents. The analysis also emphasises the strong impact of the budgetary closure rule for government debt/deficit stabilisation on the welfare results.
Model
The model consists of two regions: the small (domestic) member country of monetary union and the rest of monetary union (RoU). The model includes monopolistic competition in goods and labour markets, nominal price and wage stickiness, liquidity constraints, capital and labour as inputs into production, and a set of fiscal variables, namely consumption, labour income and capital taxes, government purchases and public transfers. The presence of intertemporal optimising (NLC), i.e. households that can freely borrow and save to smooth con-5 sumption over time, and liquidity-constrained (LC) households, i.e. households without access to financial markets who in each period consume their entire current disposable wage and transfer income, implies that fiscal variables have both substitution and income effects.
The RoU variables and monetary policy are given from the perspective of the small economy.
Goods and financial markets are imperfectly integrated across borders, namely there is home bias in the demand for goods and a debt-dependent country risk premium, and labour is immobile between countries.
Households
The household sector consists of a continuum of households i. The welfare of household i is the discounted sum of the period utilities:
Household utility is additive in private consumption i t C , government purchases t G and work i t L . The parameters β, χ, 1/σ, k and 1/φ are the discount factor, the utility weight of government purchases, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the disutility weight work, and the elasticity of labour supply. The benchmark model assumes log consumption utility, i.e. σ=1.
The households decide about private consumption and labour supply given their respective budget constraints. Government consumption enters household utility, but is not a choice variable of the households. Instead, the level of government consumption is chosen by the government as described below.
NLC households, who are a fraction 1-slc of the population, make optimal intertemporal choices given their intertemporal budget constraint: TAX is a lump-sum tax levied only on NLC households and introduced to provide a hypothetical non-distortionary benchmark for the fiscal closure rule.
The accumulation of physical capital follows the law of motion:
including capital depreciation at rate δ and quadratic cost k g of capital stock adjustment.
The NLC households maximise (2.1) given equations (2.2) and (2.3), which provides the firstorder conditions (FOC) for consumption, financial asset holdings and real capital investment: The period budget constraint of LC households constituting the share slc of the population is: 
where the parameters h and h indicate the steady-state home bias and the elasticity of substitution between domestically produced goods and imports. The resulting demand by domestic households for domestically produced goods and imports are: where ε is the elasticity of substitution between these varieties. Each variety is produced by a specialised firm j. The demand for variety j is given by:
The elasticity ε determines the price setting power of individual firms. The pricing margin of firms declines with increasing ε, because higher values of ε magnify the impact of deviations from competitor prices on firm j's market share.
The households i supply labour services i t L in a monopolistically competitive labour market.
Total labour is a composite of the differentiated labour services:
with θ being the elasticity of substitution between the varieties of labour services. The minimisation of labour costs by firms gives the demand function for variety i as:
The market power of worker i declines with increasing θ, because higher values of θ amplify the fall in the relative demand for i t L in response to higher individual wage claims.
The labour services are distributed equally across NLC and LC households, and specialised labour unions represent the different types of labour services i in the wage setting. The wage setting is subject to quadratic adjustment costs, which provide an incentive to smooth the wage adjustment and which lead to nominal wage stickiness. The optimisation problem of the labour union representing the labour service i is:
The optimal wage maximises (2.19) given labour demand (2.18) and the marginal value of NLC income (2.4) and LC income(2.10). The wage is the same for NLC and LC households, and the unions average the marginal value of NLC and LC income according to the population share of the two types of households. 
where the gross wage claims increase with increasing labour taxation ( w t t ) for given levels of employment.
Government sector
The government collects labour, capital, consumption and lump-sum taxes and issues one- 
The government needs to adjust tax revenue or expenditure to stabilise government debt and deficits around target values. This paper considers three alternative closure rules
The government can adjust purchases, transfers and tax rates in response to cyclical fluctuations. 2 The policy takes the form of simple fiscal instrument rules that are similar to simple interest rate rules in monetary policy:
, 1 1 1 , 1
(1 ) (1 ) ln 
(1 ) The emphasis on simple instrument rules owes to their practical advantages over fully optimal policy solutions. Contrary to the fully optimal policy solution, simple rules use a limited set of information. Compliance with simple rules is, consequently, easier to monitor than the commitment to fully optimal policy, and the feasibility of compliance monitoring mitigates the credibility/time-consistency problem. Credibility is crucial, because it determines the policy maker's ability to anchor the expectations of households and firms. In addition, it is plausible to assume that simple rules are easier to implement than the optimal commitment solutions, which strengthens the government's ability to react timely to business cycle fluctuations. The simulations in the subsequent sections of the paper assess the potential welfare gain from fiscal instrument rules in the context of supply and demand shocks.
The instrument rules (2.28)-(2.33) respond with one quarter delay to economic conditions, i.e. include a recognition/implementation lag as in Kirsanova et al. (2007) , whereas Beetsma and Jensen (2004 ), Ferrero (2009 ), and Galí and Monacelli (2008 The analysis has been repeated with versions of (2.28)-(2.33) including a response to (lagged) output growth in addition to the ToT response. The advantage of output growth over theoretical output gaps in policy rules is the observability of the former. Augmenting the instrument rules (2.28)-(2.33) by a direct response to output growth makes little difference from the welfare perspective, however. To keep the discussion focused, the paper does not include the respective results.
We have also tested differences between domestic and RoU output levels as indicator of economic activity and found contradictory signals for the fiscal stance. While positive domestic technology shocks would suggest demand expansion to match the higher output potential, positive demand shocks should trigger fiscal contraction to avoid an overheating of the economy. A uniform fiscal response to relative output levels irrespective of the underlying shock does not achieve such differentiation. Namely, fiscal tightening in response to a TFP-related increase in domestic output amplifies fluctuations in employment and factor use instead of dampening them. The session of robustness checks will present results for a policy rules reacting to relative levels of employment, however.
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The government adjusts tax transfer payments or taxes to stabilise government debt and the budget deficit at their target levels. In the simulations we first consider lump-sum taxes as instrument in the budgetary closure rule:
where t TAX is levied only from NLC households and btar is the target debt-to-GDP ratio.
The lump-sum closure (2.34) is standard in the literature. It provides a theoretically appealing benchmark, because it has neither distortionary nor relevant income effects for NLC or LC households. Hence, scenarios with lump-sum closure show the impact of the fiscal rules (2.28)-(2.33) without additional distortions or income effects from budgetary stabilisation and are therefore suited to illustrate the pure impact of the policy rules (2.28)-(2.33) without second-round effects from debt/deficit stabilisation.
In practice, lump-sum taxation is rare; most tax revenue comes from direct taxes. A more realistic budget closure is: 
(2.37) with 0 1 a < < . Total factor productivity t A is identical across firms and follows the AR (1) process:
where a r indicates the shock persistence and a t n is an innovation with zero mean and standard deviation a s .
The cost-minimal combination of capital and labour is given by:
which implies for the nominal marginal costs j t MC of the optimising firm:
The firms face quadratic price adjustment costs p g and set prices j t P to maximise the discounted expected profit: 4 Contrary to the Calvo model of staggered price setting which implies price dispersion, the pricing behaviour under quadratic adjustment is symmetric across firms at each period in time, so that firmlevel output can be aggregated easily to total domestic production:
Many small New Keynesian models with focus on monetary policy abstract for endogenous capital and use production functions with labour as the only (variable) input. Casares and McCallum (2006) , and Woodford (2003) show that appropriately calibrated models with constant capital can replicate business-cycle features and match models with endogenous investment fairly well with respect to the output and inflation responses namely to monetary shocks.
However, the focus in this paper on fiscal policy adds a feedback from fiscal variables, notably distortionary taxes, to physical investment, which is captured by modelling capital accumulation as endogenous process.
External accounts
The total demand for domestic output is the sum of final domestic demand, net exports and the wage/price adjustment costs
Inserting household and government demand functions (2.13)-(2.14) and (2.25)-(2.26) in (2.12) and (2.23) gives the consumer price level t P without the consumption tax:
Exports t X correspond to the import demand of the RoU analogously to equation (2.14): Combining the budget constraints of the private sector, i.e. (2.2) and (2.8), and the government (2.22) with the revenue-side definition of GDP as the sum of factor and profit income gives the aggregate resource constraint of the domestic economy:
H t t H t H t t t t t t H t t B i B P Y P C I G P ADC
which is also the law of motion for the net foreign asset (NFA) position. As specified in (2.6), the nominal interest rate in the domestic economy depends on the NFA position to rule out explosive NFA dynamics (e.g., Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2003) and the exogenous riskpremium shock.
Rest of monetary union
The RoU is treated as one single block. Trade with the small country is negligible in relation to output and domestic demand, so that we approximate the RoU as closed economy. The welfare function parallels the one for households in the small member country:
The equivalent budget constraints imply analogous consumption, investment and labour sup-17 ply decisions:
The government budget constraint is: The government adjusts labour income taxes when public debt and deficits deviate from the target levels:
Fiscal authorities in the RoU may also react to cyclical fluctuations. However, given our focus on the small domestic member country and the availability of monetary policy at the aggregate RoU level, we abstract from countercyclical fiscal rules in the RoU.
The central bank sets interest rates according to the simple rule:
The RoU firms face a profit maximisation problem analogous to firms in the small domestic economy, which determines the foreign price level: 
Demand in the RoU region is the sum of private consumption, investment, government purchases and adjustment costs:
The NFA position of the RoU is the mirror image of the small domestic economy's NFA po- Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) .
Home bias in the demand for goods h=0.50 in the small domestic economy equals 1 minus the average import-to-GDP ratio of a group of eight smaller EA-12 countries during 1999-2009.
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The weights of public purchases (χ=1/3) and employment (κ=1.79) in the utility function are chosen so that the euro area average levels of consumption, government purchases and employment for 1999-2009 satisfy the households' optimality conditions. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to 1/σ=1.0 in the benchmark model, i.e. standard logarithmic consumption utility. The value 1/φ=0.25 for the elasticity of labour supply lies in the range of microeconomic estimates, even though DSGE models often use higher values (e.g., Evers et al., 2008; Fiorito and Zanella, 2008) . The estimates for the share of liquidity-constrained households (slc) in the euro area cluster around 0.40 (e.g., Forni et al., 2009; Ratto et al., 2009 ).
The aggregate trade price elasticity η=1.5 corresponds to euro area estimates by Imbs and Méjean (2010) , and the impact of higher value will be tested in the section on robustness checks. Price and wage adjustment costs are set to match the average price and wage durations of 4 and 5 quarters reported by Druant et al. (2009) and Knell (2010) Note: All moments are based on quarterly data. Except for inflation and the trade balance, the variables are in logarithms and model-generated and data series HP-filtered (λ=1600). The mean for actual data is the non-weighted average AUT, BEL, ESP, FIN, GRC, IRL, NLD and PRT during 1999q1-2009q4; maximum and minimum values refer to the highest and lowest ranking country in this group for a particular measure. The data are seasonally and working-day adjusted. The trade balance is relative to GDP, and inflation is the year-on-year percentage change in the core CPI. The standard deviation is the absolute standard deviation for output and the standard deviation relative to the standard deviation of output for all other variables. 
Fiscal policy rules and welfare
We now turn to the welfare effects of fiscal policy rules of type (2.28)-(2.33), namely the potential welfare gain in the context of business cycle stabilisation. The simulations will illustrate that the link between cyclical and debt/deficit stabilisation is important in the assessment of the welfare effects of fiscal policy. If a deviation of the government debt/deficit level from target in the context of business cycle stabilisation has to be offset by distortionary fiscal instruments, the associated supply and demand effects must be included in welfare comparisons.
Given the relevance of second-round effects associated with the budget closure rule, we first present a scenario in which such effects are absent. In this scenario, the closure rule (2.34) implements debt/deficit stabilisation. As the lump-sum taxes are levied exclusively on NLC households, they do not alter the disposable period income of LC consumers. Given the symmetric design of the fiscal stabilisation rules (2.28)-(2.33), the net lump-sum revenue collected from NLC households for budget stabilisation zero in the long run. · Government purchase rule (A): The optimal policy from the perspective of NLC households is (basically) no response in (2.28) to the terms of trade, i.e. ξ p =0, so that the share of government purchases in GDP is constant over time. NLC households can freely borrow and lend to smooth the level of private consumption, so that welfare costs for NLC households relate to inefficient fluctuations of employment and consumption in the presence of price and wage stickiness and the resource costs of adjustment, which have to be weighed against additional volatility of government purchases in the welfare comparison (2.1). The optimal policy from the perspective of LC households is to increase government purchases relative to GDP in response to increasing terms of trade (ToT). This rather procyclical policy mitigates the tightness of the liquidity constraint and allows LC consumers to approximate the response of NLC households. As example consider the increase in domestic goods prices in response to a decline of TFP (negative supply shock) or the risk premium (positive demand shock). The negative TFP shock implies a fall in real wages and wage income. Increasing government demand mitigates the decline in LC disposable income and consumption in this context, whereas a reduction in government purchases would amplify the drop in LC revenues. The risk premium decline leads to an increase in investment and NLC consumption demand as the real interest rate declines; higher investment translates into higher marginal labour productivity, higher real wages and higher employment. LC consumption increases by less than NLC consumption, however, because LC consumers cannot borrow against future income in an environment of falling real interest rates. The procyclical increase of government purchases provides LC consumers with additional income in this situation and allows the latter to expand consumption similarly to NLC households. The debt/deficit stabilisation by labour taxes adds a distortion to the model that affects both 30 supply and demand. Consider an example in which the government increases transfers to stabilise the income of LC households. The increase in government debt and deficit levels triggers an increase in the labour tax. The labour tax increase itself reduces after-tax wages and the disposable income of LC households, so that the net effect on income stabilisation is smaller than previously under the lump-sum closure; the labour tax adjustment also introduces additional fluctuations in labour supply that are likely to increase the volatility of employment and the associated welfare loss. Hence, potential net welfare gains from stabilisation policies (2.28)-(2.33) tend to be smaller if budgetary implication need to be stabilised by distortionary labour taxes.
The reversal of the optimal response of consumption and capital taxes to the ToT in Figure 2 compared to Figure 1 follows the same logic. Figure 1 illustrates that the potential welfare gain from labour tax rate adjustment for LC and NLC households tends to exceed the potential welfare gains from optimal consumption or capital tax adjustment. Hence, the optimal consumption or capital tax response changes sign in Figure 2 to allow for an offsetting labour tax response that is more efficient in addressing the welfare costs of the underlying friction.
Consider, e.g., the capital tax: From the perspective of LC households, the optimal policy is no longer to reduce the tax rate in response to negative TFP shocks in order to stimulate capital accumulation and dampen the drop in real wages. Instead, optimal policy from the LC households' perspective now increases the capital tax to collect additional tax revenue that in turn allows reducing the labour income tax compared to a situation without capital tax increase. The labour tax directly raises the after tax income of LC households and is more efficient in stabilising LC disposable income than the indirect real wage effect of lower capital taxes. The results illustrate the importance of the budgetary impact of fiscal policy and of the underlying closure rule for the effectiveness of fiscal stabilisation policies. The implications of the transfer-based debt/deficit closure for LC households in Figure 3 are similar to those of the labour tax closure in Figure 2 give the similar impact of both instruments on the disposable period income. The potential gain from cyclical transfer adjustment in response to falling (rising) LC purchasing power is reduced as the cyclical response is partly offset by the endogenous reaction of transfers to increasing (declining) debt/deficit levels.
Also similarly to Figure 2 , the optimal response of taxes to ToT fluctuation from the perspective of LC households is reversed compared to Figure 1 . The reason is that transfers are more efficient in mitigating the impact of the liquidity constraint than the adjustment of distortionary taxes, which partly work only through indirect channels. Here again the logic is that higher budget surpluses free space for higher lump-sum transfers and LC disposable income. The optimal tax policy from the perspective of NLC households also becomes rather procyclical,
i.e. reducing the consumption, labour and capital tax burden in periods of excess demand and increasing prices, because the reduction of distortionary taxes financed by lower transfers, which at the same time reduce LC demand, provides a means to increase factor supply and reduce price and wage pressure. Hence, the optimal policy for NLC households is a tax shift from distortionary taxes to lump-sum taxes (here, lower transfers) in periods of excess demand, i.e. periods of relative supply shortage.
Robustness checks
This section provides a number of robustness checks across several dimensions of the model to assess the generality of the previous results. Unless it is explicitly mentioned otherwise, the checks focus on the policy rule for government purchases (2.28) and the lump-sum tax closure for government debt/deficit stabilisation that underlies the results in Figure 1 .
Policy response to employment
The results in section 3 may be surprising insofar as they suggest a rather procyclical response of fiscal policy to be optimal for LC consumers. LC welfare increases if government purchases and transfers are raised or taxes cut in response to an increase in the ToT. The fiscal policy rules (2.28)-(2.33) were based on the ToT as they are a more robust indicator of excess demand than output levels and because the output gap, i.e. the difference between actual output and output in the flexible economy, as alternative indicator has the theoretical disadvantage of being non-observable. 
The same modification is made in the other fiscal instrument rules (2.29)-(2.33). Positive shocks to the risk premium reduce the interest-sensitive consumption and investment demand by NLC households. As downward price and wage adjustment in the economy with price and wage stickiness is weaker than in the flexible economy, demand and output levels decline more strongly in the former and imply a stronger decline of disposable period income.
The countercyclical increase of government expenditure or tax reduction stabilises demand and employment in this situation and brings the behaviour of LC households closer to the behaviour of consumption in the flexible economy without price/wage stickiness and liquidity constraints. Symmetric reasoning applies to demand expansions in response to negative risk premium shocks.
An alternative to (3.1) is a fiscal instrument rule in which government purchases react to the employment gap as log difference between actual employment and the level of employment that would prevail in an economy without price/wage stickiness and liquidity constraints
The policy rule (3.2) for government purchases gives welfare results for LC and NLC households that are very similar to the results in Figure 4 .
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
The benchmark model in Table 1 assumes that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is unity (σ=1), which corresponds to log consumption utility. Panel A of Figure 
Response to consumer prices
Section 3 considered fiscal instrument rules (2.28)-(2.31) that react to fluctuation in the ToT, which here is the price of domestically produced goods relative to the foreign price level given that all goods are tradable and price discrimination excluded in the model.
An alternative specification to (2.28) may adjust government purchases in response to fluctuations in the CPI relative to consumer prices in the RoU:
The practical advantage of this alternative is that CPI data tend to available more timely than data for the GDP deflator, which is a precondition for timely (discretionary) policy responses. Figure 6 shows that the welfare results for the ToT-based and CPI-based reaction functions are very similar in qualitative terms. The difference between the two policy rules is that the optimal policy from the perspective of LC households shifts to the right on the ξ p axis, i.e. the optimal policy response becomes seemingly more aggressive with (3.3). The reason is that the price level of domestically produced goods accounts for half of the domestic CPI and that foreign prices are constant in the simulations. Consequently, the ξ p coefficient in the policy rule (3.3) needs to be twice as large as in (2.28) to generate the same response of government purchases to cyclical conditions as in the ToT-based reaction function. 
Reaction speed
The fiscal instrument rules (2.28)-(2.31) react with one quarter lag to the ToT to incorporate the notion of recognition/implementation lags in the conduct of fiscal policy. Figure 7 shows at whether the lagged reaction reduces the stabilising potential substantially by comparing (2.28) to an instrument rule with contemporaneous response to the ToT:
The two panels in Figure 7 indicate no substantial difference between the lagged and the contemporaneous response of government purchases to the ToT. The shapes and positions of the LC and NLC welfare curves remain almost unchanged. 
Trade price elasticity
The benchmark model adopted a price elasticity of trade flows of η=1.5 (Table 1 ). The value corresponds to estimates based on aggregate time-series data (e.g., Imbs and Méjean, 2010) and to parameter estimated in DSGE models of the euro area (e.g., Ratto et al., 2009 ). The value of η=1.5 also performs well in replicating the volatility of the trade balance in response to cyclical fluctuations (Table 2) . Micro-data estimates, on the other hand, finds higher trade price elasticities for several sectors and euro area countries. Correcting for aggregation bias, Imbs and Méjean (2010) suggest trade elasticity values of η=3, which we use for the robust-38 ness check in Figure 8 . 
Conclusions
The paper analyses fiscal stabilisation policy in a DSGE model for a small open economy in monetary union. The model includes financial, goods and labour market frictions and is calibrated to match data moments of small euro area countries over the period 1999-2009.
The paper uses the model to discuss the welfare effects on liquidity-constrained (LC) and intertemporal optimising (NLC) households of simple instruments rules in which government purchases, transfers and taxation react to supply (TFP) and demand (risk premium) shocks.
Instead of limiting the discussion on optimal simple rules, we show welfare gains/costs for a broader range of policy parameters to illustrate the robustness of the simple rules and the costs of non-optimal policy.
We find a dichotomy in the welfare gains/costs from simple fiscal instrument rules for LC and 39 NLC households. In situations where LC households gain from a particular fiscal policy rule, NLC households tend to lose from the latter. Hence, which policy is optimal depends on the household type. The overall welfare effect as the population-weighted average on LC and NLC welfare gains/costs tends to follow the outcome for LC households as the impact of fiscal policy on LC household welfare in the model is typically much larger than the impact on NLC welfare.
In the benchmark setting, fiscal variables react to fluctuations in the terms of trade (ToT) as indicator for excess demand in the economy and lump-sum taxes on NLC households are the fiscal instrument used to close the government budget constraint and stabilise government debt and deficits at their target levels. The optimal policy from the perspective of LC consumers is rather procyclical in this environment, i.e. increasing (reducing) government spending and transfers and reducing (increasing) taxes when the level of domestic prices is relatively high (low). Given the home bias in consumption and the assumed exogeneity of import prices, domestic consumer prices fluctuate proportionally with the price level of domestically produced goods. The procyclical fiscal policy response mitigates the liquidity constraint and dampens price-driven fluctuations in the purchasing power of the disposable income, so that LC households come closer to replicating the optimal response of NLC households in response to TFP and risk premium shocks. Increasing (reducing) transfers and government purchases, which generate additional demand and wage income, or reducing (increasing) taxes when goods are relatively expensive (cheap) moves the disposable nominal income of LC consumers in line with goods prices. It stabilises the real disposable income of LC households and allows the latter to consume a smooth stream of consumption in real terms despite the liquidity constraint. NLC households have no extra gain from such procyclical fiscal policy as they are able to smooth the real stream of consumption through intertemporal income transfer, i.e. by borrowing and lending in financial markets. An increase in nominal disposable income to smooth real consumption when domestic prices are high will, however, lead to increasing net imports, i.e. a deterioration of the trade balance.
The (lower) welfare gains for NLC consumer typically require countercyclical policies which keep actual output close to potential output. The countercyclical policy of stabilising actual output around its potential level reduces upward/downward price and wage pressure in the economy, which reduces the impact and economic costs of nominal price/wage and real rigidities. The countercyclical policy helps stabilising activity and employment closer to the levels 40 that would prevail in an economy without price/wage stickiness and liquidity constraints.
The paper also shows that fiscal policy rules that react to fluctuation in the (relative) level of employment or the employment gap are good and robust alternatives to instrument rules reacting to the ToT. Fiscal policy rules that respond to fluctuations in employment or the employment gap stabilise employment around the level that would prevail in the flexible economy. Through this channel such rules also stabilise the disposable income of LC households, so that LC consumption comes closer to tracking consumption in the flexible economy. In fiscal rules where the instrument reacts to employment, optimal policy from the perspective of LC households is countercyclical, i.e. increasing expenditure (reducing taxes) if employment is relatively low and vice versa, which is more in line with conventional views of optimal fiscal policy than the apparently procyclical reaction to the terms of trade.
The analysis also shows that assumptions about government debt/deficit stabilisation, i.e. the nature of the budget closure rule, are very important for the welfare implications of fiscal policy. Changing the government debt/deficit closure from (idealistic) lump-sum taxes to, e.g., distortionary labour taxation lowers the potential welfare gain from fiscal stabilisation policies and inverts the optimality results for consumption and capital taxes.
The analysis focuses on cyclical stabilisation in response to temporary shocks that imply temporary deviations of macroeconomic variables from steady-state levels. It does not address the potential of fiscal variables to correct persistent imbalances in competitiveness and economic activity, which is the topic of the literature on fiscal devaluations (e.g., de Mooij and Keen, 2012; Farhi et al., 2011) . The result that rather procyclical fiscal policy, which increases (reduces) government expenditure (taxes) when domestic goods are relatively expensive (excess demand) would be optimal from the perspective of LC households, appears rather problematic from the external imbalance perspective, because such policy tend to amplify the swings in domestic demand and external accounts. Subsequent work could discuss the implications of the optimal policies for current account and net foreign asset positions. Fiscal policy rules with countercyclical response to employment may be preferable from this perspective. Further work may also enlarge the set of fiscal instruments available for stabilisation purposes to include, e.g., government employment, public investment, and unemployment benefits.
